

# The Political Representation and the Provincial Government in Spain<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

Political science has studied the political representation of different institutions, but just the field of administrative law has focused in the study of the Provincial Councils. In Spain, the provincial institution has become one of the most controverted institutions and several groups have claimed to remove it as an intermediate organism. The political composition of this institution is based on the electoral outcomes at the municipal level, in other words, it is an indirect representation. Therefore, the Provincial Councils are not considered as totally democratic institutions. Nevertheless, the political composition of the Provincial Councils represents the municipal electoral results as the main axis. Besides, several mechanisms have been implemented in order to warranty that the distribution of the seats among the political parties actually reflects the political composition as the electoral system. Following this reflection, some questions arise about this institution, i.e., which parties have been benefit for the electoral system? And, how the provincial governments have been configured? The aim of this research is to analyze the political representation of the provincial councils and their government through the distribution of the seats.

## Keywords:

Provincial Council, Representation, Provincial Government, Indirect Election

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## Introduction

The representation systems of the Spanish political institutions are framed as a parliamentary system. Throughout the different government levels (national, federal and local level) the Spanish political system is articulated by a parliamentary system. The main objective of this system is the formation of governments through the political composition of the corresponding institution. The representatives elected to form the legislative power are those who decide which government can be constituted with their votes. Along the electoral campaigns, the configuration of the electoral lists, headed by the proposed leader to rule the government, allow the electorate to identify the presidential politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2007). Therefore, this system of choice legitimizes the government that is constituted through the representation of the legislature.

Normally, the representatives are directly elected by the citizens with the aim and the authority to form the government, in contrast, Provincial Councils<sup>2</sup> is composed of members that are elected indirectly by the citizens. The Provincial Councils are the higher level of the local government, between the municipalities and the Autonomous Communities. This type of institution is also present across several countries of Europe as the French *Departaments* or the *Landkreise* in Germany, which are called the second tier of local government (Heinelt and Bertrana, 2011). The literature of political science has usually neglected this second tier of local government when addressing the political institution and its components such as representation or the electoral system which selects its representatives.

Therefore, the peculiarity of this political institution discloses several relevant questions related to the configuration of political institutions composed of members elected indirectly by citizenship, the institutional mechanisms to configure the representatives and their government, the type of government resulting from that configuration and the parties that are being benefited or harmed by these electoral mechanisms. The literature on administrative law and political science has addressed part of these questions but others remain to be studied.

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<sup>2</sup> The Spanish name of the Provincial Councils are *Diputaciones Provinciales*. The term was taken from Bertrana, Espinosa y Magre (2011).

The purpose of this research is to analyze the representation in the second tier of the local government in Spain: Provincial Councils. Firstly, the literature about the local government in Spain will be reviewed compared to the exploration of other social fields. The second part, it will be described the methodological aspect about how we will treat and elaborate a new own database. Finally, it will be interpreted and created some judgement through the data that have been collected.

### **The Spanish second-tier of local government: The Provincial Councils.**

After the death of the Spanish dictator Franco, the Spanish politics was focused to reestablish democracy in the whole country; so, the main political actors and the society was focused on the national politics and its institutions. This period, the Spanish Transition, was characterized by building up the territorial organization of the state that included the Autonomous Communities. Along this process, competences were generated for this new government level at the expense of the provincial councils (Bertrana et al., 2011; Harguindéguy and Cole, 2017). Meanwhile the rest of the political spheres, specially the local level government, were forgotten until the municipal elections in 1979.

The creation of the Autonomous Communities generated a lack in the local political sphere. However, the local government needed a renewal in its institutions, new political democratic mechanisms and people who replaced the local elites from the old regime and generated a new pluralist representation. In other words, the local sphere was a new political arena with quotes of power that the main political parties of the national level wanted to take it (Botella, 1992; Ubasart-Gonzalez, 2012). Before this electoral period, the national approved Local Elections Act (LEL, *ley de elecciones locales* in Spanish)<sup>3</sup> for the future electoral calls to the local governments, simple rules what maintain the electoral system from the national level into the local one. Years after the LEL, these electoral measures and local institutions remained with the ratification of other two new laws: the General Electoral Regime Act (LOREG, *ley orgánica del*

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<sup>3</sup> Ley 39/1978, de 17 de julio, de elecciones locales (LEL). <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1978/07/21/pdfs/A17267-17275.pdf>

*regimen electoral general* in Spanish)<sup>4</sup> and the Local Regime Basement Regulatory Act (LRBRL, *Ley reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local* in Spanish)<sup>5</sup>.

The Spanish local government is constituted by two different institutions in the same government level: the municipalities and the provinces. The first is the basic territorial unit of government (Vallés and Brugué, 2001), which in refers to the City Halls in villages and towns. On the other side, the province is a district which englobes all the municipalities directed by the provincial councils. Sometimes, there is a widespread belief in society that the provincial councils are an aggrupation of the municipalities<sup>6</sup>, but they have their own autonomous organization<sup>7</sup> (Garrido, 2000a). Nevertheless, the focus of this research is in the representation and government of the province: the provincial councils.

The provincial council is an institution founded at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The provincial institution has been maintained throughout the two past centuries. This institution has been modified in a few little aspects to guarantee institutional patterns due to the laws and acts that the national level approved generating a *path dependence* in the Spanish local world (Márquez, 2010; Harguindéguy and Cole, 2017). The main way to define the Provincial Council is by describing this tier of local government, which can be seen as a *territorial level of self-government based on a multipurpose jurisdiction* (Heinelt and Bertrana, 2011:1). So, the provincial institution is an autonomous entity, but is dependent on other instances of government as other institutions are under the provincial councils.

When we consider the other institutions that are under the provincial councils, we must recognize that the main function of the provincial councils is drawing up cooperation plans with the municipalities to guarantee that citizens have access to the

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<sup>4</sup> Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General (LOREG). <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1985/06/20/pdfs/A19110-19134.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local (LRBRL). <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1985/04/03/pdfs/A08945-08964.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Even the Spanish Constitution of 1978 collects the concept of province as an aggrupation of municipalities in its article 141.1: *The province is a local entity with its own legal personality, determined by the grouping of municipalities and territorial division for the fulfillment of the activities of the State.*

<sup>7</sup> There are other local institutions such as the *pedanías*, *mancomunidades* and *concejos*, which are the result of the voluntary grouping of several municipalities. In addition, the municipalities that have been in provinces with Provincial Council are subject to this institution.

“compulsory municipal services” (Bertrana et al., 2011: 232). There are some municipalities that cannot ensure some essential services according to their own population and population (Vallés and Brugué, 2001), because of that, the provincial institutions must secure the satisfaction of these services (Botella, 1992). The aim for the creation of this institution is the decentralization of the State and the distribution of the resources allocated in such a way that all citizens have access to the principal services (Bertrana et al., 2011) Therefore, these municipalities resort to the Provincial Delegation to be able to finance the services that they cannot cover themselves up. On the other hand, the provincial councils are autonomous instances, which are economically and legally dependent on other higher levels of government as the Autonomous Communities (Botella, 1992).

The creation of the Autonomous State in Spain generated a dispute for the regional power about the competences that each one can develop with other institutions, in particular the conflict was with provincial institutions (Bertrana et al., 2011). In regard to the composition of Autonomous Community with just one province, the duplication of the political tasks in the region that’s why the provincial councils of the Autonomies with just one province were eliminated<sup>8</sup>. Despite this political measure, there is an extended feeling in wide sectors of the Spanish society, which claims for removing this intermediate government level. Several corruption cases affecting to many Provincial Councils in last years have contributed to extend that feeling.

As it was mentioned beforehand, the Spanish society has a strong belief in favor of the suppression of the provincial institution because is a nest of clientelism and corruption and their functions can be exercised perfectly by the autonomous government. Despite this social demand, many scholars who works this government level, specifically the provincial councils, have defended the reform of the institutional mechanisms (Merino and Rivera, 2014, Harguindéguy and Cole, 2017). The main reason by which most people claim for a reform or suppression of the institution is because of its electoral system and the indirect representation that characterizes the

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<sup>8</sup> The provinces of Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia and Navarra have acquired the status of Autonomous Communities. Thus, the duplication of government institutions dedicated to the same purpose led to the elimination of the provincial institution in these regions.

Provincial Councils. If the system of choice is changed, it would change the functions of representation and, therefore, the decision-making process.

### **The formation of an own political elite: the representation in Provincial Councils.**

The political composition of Provincial Councils is build up through indirect representation mechanisms. The configuration of the political representation in the Provincial Councils depends of the electoral results in the municipalities of the province assigning seats to political parties or electoral platforms according to the votes they have obtained in the municipalities of the electoral district<sup>9</sup>. Therefore, the structural axis of the provincial representation reflects in some extent the strength of the political parties because they received the seats and the counsellors under the support of the parties which decided who took the place (Garrido, 2000a). The provincial councilors are required to have been elected councilor in some municipality of the province in the past elections. The provincial councilors are elected among and by the municipal representatives (Garrido, 2000a; Bertrana et al., 2011). The number and distribution of the representatives in each province depends on the population of the provincial territory<sup>10</sup>. Within the provinces, the seats are distributed among the different electoral districts that correspond to the territories of first instance court.

While a substantial majority of works of the local world are focused on the conformation and representation of the elites in the municipalities (Capo, Baras, Botella and Colomé, 1988; Botella, 1992), the configuration of the representation in the Provincial Councils has gone unnoticed. In the first municipal elections, there was a wide variety in the conformation of the city councils. However, both state-level political parties and autonomous parties were established and consolidated at the municipal level as local elections progressed (Botella, 1992; Márquez, 1999). The local sphere was

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<sup>9</sup> In the assignation of seats, the province is divided into electoral districts that are the judicial parties. The distribution of the seats among the electoral districts is with the aim to due all the less populous municipalities can obtain representation (Garrido, 2000b). For that reason, all electoral districts have a minimum of one seat and a maximum of three fifths of the totality.

<sup>10</sup> The minimum of deputies is 25 that is in the provinces that have less than 500,000 inhabitants. If the provinces have a population between 500,001 and 1,000,000 inhabitants have been assigned 27 deputies. While the provinces will have 31 deputies and its population is between 1,000,001 and 3,500,000. Finally, if the population exceeds 3,500,001 inhabitants will be assigned 51 deputies, the only one which has this circumstance is the province of Barcelona. The distribution of seats is recognized in art.204.1 LOREG.

another electoral arena to enter the institutions that political parties had to cover (Botella, 1992).

During the first years of democracy, the local institutions obtained a heterogonic and plural representation in the city halls. The social movements, neighborhood organizations and independents created candidacies, which reached a substantial representation at the beginning of the local democracy (Capo et al., 1988). In the next elections, the national level parties started to promote their structure in the local sphere consolidating a national party system in the local institutions. This phenomenon is the *nationalization thesis*, in which local politics is marked by the national political agenda because the main local political actors are the national parties (Botella, 1992; Ubasart-Gonzalez, 2012). This process of nationalization could be reflected in the Provincial Councils. On the one hand, the its political representation is shaped by the municipal electoral results; and, on the other hand, the electoral system is majoritarian and produce a disproportional representation (Bertrana et al., 2011; Harguindéguy and Cole, 2017).

This research is descriptive-exploratory with respect to the political composition of the Provincial Councils and the subsequent configuration of the governments of this political institution. It is based on two dimensions of the study i.e historical and institutional. The historical dimension considers the route of the political composition of the Provincial Councils and the configuration of the governments of these in reference to their composition from 1987 to 2011. The institutional dimension stands on the institutional mechanisms for its composition (laws) to preserve its composition (Márquez, 2003). The objective is to prove if the nationalization thesis is produced in the provincial level also and how these can affect to the provincial government formation.

### **How can we study the second tier of local government in Spain?**

This work was carried out around the development of a proper database built up by collecting information from both primary and secondary sources. The primary

sources were the electoral information website of the Ministry of Interior<sup>11</sup> and the Provincial Official Gazette (BOP) on the composition and elective session of provincial governments. The secondary sources were mainly collected from press news on constitution and government of Provincial Councils.

The database was structured in three parts. The first part dealt with basic data as year of the legislature, provincial deputation and number of seats; this part was to note that the analysis unit was each session of the Council. The second part referred to the government of the institution: president of the deputation, party or political parties that govern, type of government (majority government, minority government or coalition government), if the mandate was interrupted, the cause of the interruption, ... and the third and last part compiled the political representation of all the political parties or electoral platforms that had in that council during that legislative period. Through the representation data, it was calculated the representatives' concentration (in the two national largest parties, PP and PSOE) and the effective number of parties.

The goal of this analysis is the provincial representatives that have obtained the political forces from the legislature of 1987-1991 to the legislature 2011-2015 in the 38 Provincial Councils of General Regime<sup>12</sup>, since these are based on a system of indirect election. That makes a total of 266 analysis units, which is each legislature in every province. The composition of the Provincial Councils that are taken is 1987, since this point was two years after the LOREG was approved and the system of designation of seats was institutionalized.

### **The indirect representation and the configuration of the governments in the Provincial Councils.**

Municipal elections were held in 1987, two years after the ratification of the LOREG Act, which established the bases and mechanisms of the Spanish electoral

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/busquedaAvanzadaAction.html> (Website consulted between August-October 2016).

<sup>12</sup> In this research, it is not included the Basque Country (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) because these provinces have a different political system from the rest and do not depend to the national level. The Basques provincial councils have a different way to distribute the seats and the citizens vote to choose their representatives.




system. Therefore, the configuration of the political representation of the Provincial Councils was institutionalized through this law which configured the electoral outcomes that have been given in the municipalities of each province since then. The Spanish central government has called up to the polls seven times more every 4 years (1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011) since the municipal elections in 1987. Just after every municipal election call with the electoral outcomes, the provincial representation was constituted.

The political forces that have obtained representation in the Provincial Councils can be categorized into three groups based on the interests and spheres of political action (Barberà and Hopkins, 2009; Vergé and Barberà 2009). First, the most study parties of the national level which have obtained representation in all the government levels generating a political hegemony in the different territory levels. Second, the political forces which its political action and representation circumscribes to a regional sphere, where they can obtain their highest power quotes. Third, the political parties or platforms which have their political action and representation in just one or a few municipalities and do not have the intention to reach higher power quotes; its representation is limited to the local government level. Thus, this distinction helps to articulate the various political forces that have obtained representation from 1987 to 2015 in the Provincial Councils in the following three categories: state party, non-state party and local party (Annex 1).

From the classification made, the parties are grouped and you can see the representation they have obtained in the different legislatures according to the previous classification. The national or state-level parties occupied and reach almost the 90% of the representation in the Provincial Councils (Figure 1). In contrast, the non-state parties and local parties are the rest of the representation (10%), which majority belongs to the regional parties. The highest representation of the local parties was 14 representatives in the legislature 1987-1991; after this one, the local parties never obtained more than 1% of the representatives.

**Figure 1. Representation of the political parties in the Provincial Councils (1987-2015).**



Source: Own elaboration.


On the other hand, the non-state parties obtained an important representation in some Autonomous Communities because of the electoral support of the strong regional identity (CiU in Catalonia, PAR in Aragon or BNG in Galicia). When concentrating the representatives of all legislatures in PP and PSOE, the two largest national or state parties, it became clear their evolution the along the past 25 years. PP and PSOE are the most voted parties in the municipal elections and concentrate an important number of councillors. The features of the electoral system for the Provincial Councils works as a majoritarian electoral system and its representation becomes more limited.

Therefore, the 75% of the representatives in Provincial Councils were PPs or PSOE's members in the legislature 1987-1991 are; then, for the rest of the legislatures PPs and PSOE altogether rose to 85% of the representatives. Moreover, the four past legislatures<sup>13</sup> exceeded and ranked more than an 85%, almost 90% (Figure 2). Thus, it is followed that the representation of other state parties (IU, UPyD or CDS) in the Provincial Councils was very low, in some cases as the last two legislatures was lower

<sup>13</sup> The legislatures that it refers are the following periods: 1999-2003, 2003-2007, 2007-2011 and 2011-2015.

than 3%. The exception was the legislature 1987-1991, when the CDS still existed and IU was stronger after its re-foundation. Both parties reached a 10% of the provincial representation.

**Figure 2. Representation of the PP and PSOE in the Provincial Councils (1987-2015).**



**Source: Own elaboration.**

However, there is a huge difference between the legislature 1987-1991 and the rest in terms of representation of the PP and PSOE, in addition of the occurrence of other state-level parties. In the first legislature studied, there were only five provinces that reached more than 90% of the representation<sup>14</sup>. Apart of that, the rest of provinces had an important representation of other political forces as regional parties like PAR in Aragon<sup>15</sup> or PA in Andalusia<sup>16</sup> or local parties with an importance influence as SI in Burgos or independent candidacies. However, the two main state parties maintained the hegemony of representation in the provincial councils. Nonetheless, the most striking cases were some provinces of Castilla y León (Avila, Burgos and Segovia) that did not reach 70% and the following exceed it in these elections. From this legislature, more than half of the Councils had a representation of 90% or over among the PP and PSOE. Then it started a process of expansion of the two national parties across Castilla y León,

<sup>14</sup> These provinces were Cuenca, Albacete, Caceres, Castellon and Toledo. These provinces maintain throughout the time as the same representation, even increasing the representation of PP and PSOE until the 100% of the provincial counsellors.

<sup>15</sup> Aragon is composed by three provinces: Huesca, Teruel and Zaragoza.

<sup>16</sup> The PA was strongly rooted in some Andalusian provinces such as Cadiz and Seville, even the party became the second political force in the Cadiz deputation in the 1991-1995 legislature.

Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura. In the next elections, this hegemony continued in other regions impacting in the representation of regional parties as the elimination of UV in Valencia, the incorporation of CG in the PP in Ourense or the gradual fall of the PA in Andalusia. Although the PSOE had a wide representation in almost all the Catalan provinces, especially in Barcelona, the PP has a very small representation being CiU, one of the main parties in Catalonia. In each of the legislatures, it is confirmed that it is not the same representation in the Provincial Councils (Annex 2).

This hegemony of the main national parties in all provinces and the CiU in the Catalan provinces, in large part, the majority system of seat designation generates majorities in representation. This was the reason why 77% of the 265 provincial governments formed along the democratic period were majorities, since there was a party that controlled more than 50% of the representation. It was the type of government that was mostly produced in the Provincial Councils in all legislatures. By contrast, the minority government was the least produced with little more than 5% of the total. In fact, in some legislatures there was no minority government. It was also because they arranged agreements that led to coalitions of government. This type of government was quite significant because in some legislatures they surpassed more than 20% of the provincial governments.

**Table 1. Types of government in Provincial Councils (1987-2015).**

	Majority Government		Minority Government		Coalition Government	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
LEG 1987-1991	27	71,05	3	7,89	8	21,05
LEG 1991-1995*	33	89,19	0	0	4	10,81
LEG 1995-1999	28	73,68	6	15,79	4	10,53
LEG 1999-2003	31	81,58	0	0	7	18,42
LEG 2003-2007	28	73,68	2	5,26	8	21,05
LEG 2007-2011	25	65,79	1	2,63	12	31,58
LEG 2011-2015	32	84,21	3	7,89	3	7,89
Total	204	76,98	15	5,66	46	17,36

Source: Own elaboration

\* In this legislature, it is only 37 provincial governments analysed. The government of the province Ourense could not be part of the analysis.

Finally, we have analysed the types of provincial governments based on the stability of governments according to the ability of parties to form a government<sup>17</sup>. When crossing the type of government with the effective number of parties, it was observed that the smaller the number of parties, the greater the government in the majority. While the greater number of parties, the more likely there was to be a coalition of government. Therefore, the effective number of parties was very small. The effective number of parties tended to oscillate between 2 and 2.5, there were even several cases that are less than 2. The most representative example is in the 1991-1995 legislature when some parties prevail in the provinces and almost all the councils had an effective number equal to 2 or less. Thus, the effective number of parties that occurred in the provincial representation contributed to form majority governments (Annex 3).

## **Conclusions**

This research compiles the political representation in the Provincial Councils from the first legislature (1987-1991), right after the approval of the LOREG Act, until the past legislature (2011-2015). It explores the relevance of political parties at the provincial level in terms of representation in the institution and in the formation of the provincial government through representation. From a descriptive perspective, this study shows the political representation in the Councils and the governments which have been conformed in the current local democracy in Spain.

Throughout the period covered in this study, it is reflected that state-level parties have been settled since 1987, but have achieved higher representation rates from the nineties and their highest point is from 2007 to 2015. Not only local parties, but those at the regional level are also reduced to the slightest expression, comprising both types of parties around 10% of the provincial representatives. In addition, the substantial majority of the representatives of the state parties are circumscribed to the two major parties, PP and PSOE. On numerous occasions, these parties group the total representation of the Provincial Councils, even more than half of the number of la institution have 90% or more of the representatives of these two parties. The exception will be the four provinces of Catalonia, where CiU had high rates of power and

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<sup>17</sup> In the database, the assigned values are as follows: 1 is the value for majority government; 2 is the value for minority governments; and, 3 is the government in coalition.

representation, despite PSOE has a high representation. This can be explained from the rationale that the most repeated and common type of government is the majority government, controlled by a single party. The representation of this party is greater than 50% and, normally, the government usually is of one of the two main national parties. Nevertheless, the formation of government through coalitions is quite frequent, but in regions that may have a strong regional party with provincial representation. The effective number of parties in these provinces is usually higher than 2.5 favouring coalitions of government as in Aragon or some provinces of Andalusia.

The thesis of nationalization in the local sphere is confirmed by the huge representation obtained by state-level parties due to the mechanisms of the electoral system for the provincial representatives. The elements of the designation system of seats, nominated as majority, generate a very low effective number of parties in the councils. Furthermore, in all the legislatures, the representation of the institution has been concentrated mainly in one of the two parties forming government of a single colour. The formation of the government only needs the support of the representatives of their own party because they had 50% or more of the councillors. Therefore, national parties not only have hegemony in the national or autonomous level, but also in the local sphere.

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**Annex 1. Political parties which had representation in the Provincial Councils (1987-2015)**

State Party	Non-State Party	Local Party
PSOE	CiU	SI (Burgos)
PP (AP, CG**)*	BNG (PNG)*	AICR (Ciudad Real)
CDS	PA	IPN (Lerida)
IU (ICV)***	UV	GIL (Malaga, Cadiz, Sevilla)
PTE-UC	PAR	ADI (Cadiz)
PDP	CNG	APP (Palencia)
UPyD	ERC	AIAV (Avila)
	UPL	ALSI (ASI)* (Soria)
	PAP	IP (Cadiz)
	TC-PNP	CDA-PNA (Lerida)
	CHA	AB (Burgos)
	Compromís (Bloc)*	GIAL (Almeria)
	PSA	IDES (Soria)
		PdAL (Almería)
		FCJ (Cadiz)
		UCOR (Cordoba)
		PPSO (Soria)
		ADEIZA-UPZ (Zamora)
		Independents (Ciudad Real, Leon, Pontevedra, Teruel)

**Source: Own elaboration.**

\* These parties have undergone a refoundation or union process. The party in parentheses its original one that had previous representation.


\*\* Centrists of Galicia (CG) was a former political party in Galicia (non-state party), which was founded of the split of CDS members and later fused with the PP in 1992. Its president, Xulio José Baltar, passed to be the president of the Provincial Council and PP in Ourense.

\*\*\*According to Vergé and Barberà (2009), ICV is a Non-State party, which only operates in Catalonia, but IU have representation quotes in this political party.




**Annex 2. The representative concentration of the two largest parties in Spain (PSOE and PP) in the Provincial Councils throughout the legislatures.**

**Legislature 1987-1991**




Source: Own elaboration.

**Legislature 1991-1995**




**Source: Own elaboration.  
Legislature 1995-1999**




**Source: Own elaboration.**

**Legislature 1999-2003**




**Source: Own elaboration.**

### Legislature 2003-2007




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### Legislature 2007-2011




Source: Own elaboration.

## Legislature 2011-2015




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
## Annex 3. Interaction between type of government and Effective Number of Parties in Provincial Council (1987-2015)




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
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
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
Source: Own elaboration.



**Source: Own elaboration.**



**Source: Own elaboration.**



**Source: Own elaboration.**